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I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1980s and mid-1990s, Peru was the leading producer of coca leaves, providing 60 to 70 percent of international coca trafficking requirements, while Colombia was the main producer of refined cocaine (UNDCP 2002) . As a result, coca eradication and interdiction are the most common policies aimed at reducing the production and distribution of cocaine. Peru implemented the so-called "air-bridge" denial between Peru and Colombia in 1995 where local militaries took control of airports and ports in coca regions. This policy was also accompanied by the dismantling of the powerful Cali cartel in Colombia. Prices declined below production costs and farmers started abandoning their coca fields in Peru while in Colombia drug traffickers demanded large-scale homegrown crops. Estimates suggest that coca leaf production declined by 66 percent in Peru and shifted towards Colombia. Very little is known about the effect of the negative change in coca production on children's time allocation in rural areas, where most of children work. The only evidence shows that the positive demand shock increased self-employment earnings and labor supply of teenage boys in rural Colombia (Angrist and Kugler 2005) . The main purpose of this paper is to use this shift to examine whether the coca economy has an effect on child labor and schooling in Peru.
Understanding how exogenous shocks affect education and child labor (defined as children engaged in market work) is important for several reasons. One of the main features of child labor in developing countries is that a large share of children in rural areas works in agriculture (Edmonds and Pavnick 2005a) . In Peru, 93 percent of economically active children were engaged in agriculture in 1994. Additionally, coca was a relevant source of agricultural employment and income in the 1990s. In 1995, about 200,000 households had an economy based on coca production or activities related to it (INEI 2000) . Even though the price of raw coca leaf 1 makes up a small fraction of the price of cocaine, it is higher than for legal crops and most estimates suggest that coca cultivation played an important role in the economy (Steiner, 1998) . 1 Critics of drug interdiction and eradication argue that these policies have substantial economic costs for rural producers (Thoumi 2002 , Cotler 1999 . Theoretical and empirical evidence have shown that when family income decreases there will be less child leisure, less school, and more child work. For example, the Basu and Van (1998) seminal model show that the household will send children to work if adult income or family income from non-child labor sources becomes very low. A poor household cannot afford to consume the good of child leisure but it will as soon as adult income rises sufficiently.
Other factors might play a role as well. For example, wages and child labor might decrease in states that are more exposed to coca production and experience larger declines in demand.
Another scenario, however, could be that farmers to shift toward less skill-intensive crops where the demand for child labor increases.
2 Likewise, changes in the return of education as a consequence of the anti-coca policies affect child labor and schooling but it could go either way.
If households switch to other crops where higher education is needed, the expected returns to schooling increase and there will be more schooling and less work. The loss of revenues and rents from coca production might affect local public finance altering the quality of education and worsening returns to education.
Ultimately, the net effect of changes in coca production on child labor and schooling depends on the relative strength of these channels. The existing empirical literature suggests a 1 Estimates regarding how much revenue Peru received annually from the drug trade during this period range from US$800 to US$550 million (Steiner, 1998) . 2 One of the main problems is that for most children working in rural farms or family enterprises, wages are not observable. Different alternatives have been used such as estimating a family farm production function where the marginal productivities of labor are a measure of shadow wages (Jacoby and Skoufias 1997) . Another empirical strategy is to exploit variation in economic conditions, as these will alter the wage or value of children's time. For example, empirical evidence has shown that financial crisis leads to higher child labor especially among the poor and younger children (Funkhouser 1999 , Skoufias and Parker 2006 , Rucci 2003 .
2 negative association between increases in rice prices caused by trade liberalization and child labor in Vietnam, this effect varies across children that differ in their households' exposure to rice prices as consumers and producers with income playing an important role (Edmonds and Pavnick 2005b) . But also there is evidence that higher coffee prices caused by market liberalization in Nicaragua increases child labor, so that the dominant effect of rising coffee prices is through labor demand (Kruger 2004) .
Using data from the Peruvian Living Measurement Survey (PLSMS), I compare the response of child labor and schooling before and after the anti-coca policy for a group of children living in states able to cultivate coca leaves (treatment group) to a group living in states that were not able to produce coca leaves due to climate, soil conditions, infrastructure, and other environmental conditions, and thus not affected by the change in policy (comparison group).
After several sensitivity checks, the estimates suggest that the decrease in coca production is associated with large increases in child labor. In particular, child labor increased in coca-growing states by 18 and 40 percent in 1997 and 2000 respectively, with no effect on schooling outcomes.
While labor force participation increased more in 2000 than in 1997, the effect on the intensity of work both inside and outside the household was higher in 1997. Likewise, there are increases in wage work for male adults with more than primary school with small effect on participation for men with less than primary school. The data also shows that the increase in market work for children is not caused by increased in wage work, but it is operating through increases in agricultural work where 96 percent of children are non-remunerated workers in the family farm.
Results suggest that children are not working in the formal market as substitutes for unskilled labor; rather the increase in market and domestic work appears as children filling in for working parents. In addition, schooling cost appears to play a role in households where children can not 3 work in the family enterprise or farm to buffer the negative shock in adult labor demand. These findings suggest a previously undocumented indirect effect of drug policies on household behavior.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: the next section presents the institutional background information; Section III outlines the econometric methodology and describes the data used in the empirical section; Section IV presents the regression results; Section V discusses several factors that may influence the interpretation of the results in this study; and finally, Section VI offers concluding comments.
II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Changes in coca production have important attributes. 3 First, coca cultivation is based on climate, soil, infrastructure, and other environmental conditions. The coca bush is a crop that prospers especially between 600 and 2,000 meters above sea level and in the lower tropical rainforest regions of the Andes. 4 Second, households with children are no more likely to cultivate coca than households without children are. Neither the activities of children nor their presence influence coca cultivation. It is part of a tradition among Andean peasants. Before the 1970s, the production was exclusively for chewing, alternative medicine, and ritual ceremonies, all classified as "traditional legal use" by the United Nations in 1988. With the increasing demand for drugs, however, coca leaves acquired an important value as the principal input in the production of cocaine.
3 Throughout this paper coca production refers to production of raw materials (coca leaves) and not the production of cocaine. 4 It belongs to the Erythoxylon genotype that includes around 250 species but only two contain cocaine, which are mainly cultivated in Peru and Colombia (UNDCP 2003) .
Third, coca farming is the most labor-intensive stage of cocaine production. In addition to clearing and preparing the fields for planting the coca seedlings, coca farming may require weeding, pruning, and manual hoeing before plants reach maturity. The first collection of leaves takes place six months after planting, and large amounts of labor are required for picking the leaves, drying, and transporting them to local markets (Riley 1996 , Morales 1989 . 5 In 1995, about 200,000 households had an economy based on coca production or activities related to (INEI 2000) . Even after the introduction of counter-narcotics policies in 1995, coca farming still represents a large fraction of income for peasants. For example, it represents 48 percent of total net family income in the basin of the Apurimac River where most coca is harvested in 2000 (Bedoya, 2003) .
Finally, until 1995 Peru was the leading producer of coca leaves. In 1989, Peru produced about 186,300 hectares, followed by Bolivia with 78,300 hectares and Colombia with 33,072 for a total of 297,672 hectares (UNODC 1999). 6 Moreover, 60 to 70 percent of international coca trafficking requirements were supplied by Peru (UNDCP 2002). While Peru and Bolivia were the main producers of coca leaves in the 1980s and 1990s, Colombia was the principal exporter and producer of coca paste and cocaine with a share of nearly 40 percent of the world supply of cocaine (UNODC 1999).
5 Peasants sell dried coca leaves for the production of coca paste, which uses a simple process that takes four to five days. This second stage involves maceration to separate the alkaloid cocaine from the leaves using kerosene and other organic solvents. On average, about 341 kilos of coca leaves mixed with different chemicals and water make 3 kilos of coca paste (Morales, 1989) . Most of this coca paste is shipped to Colombia or local urban areas to illegal laboratories to produce coca base, obtained by removing impurities and concentrating alkaloid content (Riley 1996) . The final stage consists of the refinement of coca base to produce cocaine hydrochloride: on average 3.8 kilos of coca paste yield 1 kilo of cocaine (Morales, 1989 The identification strategy relies on an exogenous shift in coca production caused by counter-narcotics policies. Angrist and Kugler (2005) use this variation to explain changes in adult and teenage labor in Colombia, and they find small effects. As they acknowledge, however, one of the main problems with their study is that they cannot disentangle the effect of increased coca production from a secular increase in rural insurgent activity. The analysis for Peru, however, does not suffer from this problem since the insurgent activity from Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) has declined drastically since 1993. Most children who work combine it with school, using Peruvian data for 1991, Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997) find that child labor affects age-grade distortion for indigenous children 11 The questions asked are: "Did you work last week as a dependent for an enterprise, government, or selfemployment? Did you work last week as self-employed, non-paid apprentice, or helping in a family farm?" These questions did not change across years. 12 The International Labor Organization distinguishes between child in economic activity and child labor. The former is a broad concept that encompasses most productive activities by children, including unpaid and illegal work as well as work in the informal sector. The latter is a narrower concept excluding all those children 12 years and older who are working only a few hours a week in permitted light work and those 15 years and above whose work is not classified as "hazardous" (ILO 2002) . Using household surveys it is not possible to distinguish between hazardous and non-hazardous work.
III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY

Data
8 but not for the whole sample. The authors hypothesize that Peruvian children can combine school and work without negative effects because this extra income makes it possible to attend school.
Empirical Methodology
The parameter of interest in assessing the impact of a policy is the effect of treatment on the treated, which compares the outcome of interest in the treated state ( ) with the outcome in the untreated state ( ) conditional on receiving treatment. If we could observe ( , ) for everyone, the gain of being in the program is
The evaluation problem is that these outcomes cannot be observed for any single individual in both states, the treatment indicator can take either the value 0 or 1 but not both. Assessing the impact of any policy requires making an inference about the outcomes that would have been observed for people affected the policy had it not been implemented. In absence of a controlled, randomized assignment, no direct estimate of the counterfactual outcome is available. Instead, the outcome of people not affected by the policy, or comparison group, proxy for the missing counterfactual. One commonly used nonexperimental estimator is the difference-in-difference estimator, which compares the change in outcomes in the treatment group before and after the policy to the change in outcomes in the comparison group.
The objective of this paper is the identification of the average effect of anti-coca policies on child labor and schooling in states in which coca is harvested. In particular, compare child labor and schooling outcomes in states that are affected by the anti-coca policy to the counterfactual, which is child labor and schooling in coca-growing states had the policy not been implemented. At a given point in time, however, a child is observed to be in either a coca-growing state or a non-growing state. This paper uses an exogenous counter-narcotics policy that leads to a shift in coca production from Peru to Colombia, where most coca is now harvested, to identify the missing counterfactual. The identification strategy exploits the fact that counternarcotics policies affect people in rural areas living in states that based on climate, soil, infrastructure, and other environmental conditions who are able to cultivate coca leaves (treatment group), and compare them to children living in states who were not able to do so (comparison group).
Formally, the difference-in-difference model estimates the average treatment effect on the treated as a linear regression model:
where i is an index for an individual ith living in state j in year t. 13 The dependent variable Y ijt reflects the outcome of interest such as whether the child is employed or not, hours worked, domestic work, school attendance, among others. X ijt is a vector of demographic variables. C j is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if state j is coca leaf producer and 0 otherwise, and represent year dummies for the after period. difference-in-difference estimator controls for systematic differences across both states and time.
In other words, the estimator compares child labor and schooling within states for children before and after the policy and differences in time-invariant community characteristics, while comparing coca-growing states with non-growing states differences in changes that are not due to coca farming. This estimation, however, may yield biased estimates if there are omitted or unobserved state characteristics correlated with the error term. For instance, coca-growing states may have lower economic growth and fewer employment opportunities for reasons not linked with the reduction in coca production. For that reason, I include state fixed effects in equation
(1). To take into account the level of aggregation of the analysis, all standard errors are clustered at the state-survey round to correct for potential correlated error terms.
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The key identifying assumption is that the change in the outcome of interest in comparison areas is an unbiased estimate of the counterfactual. While I cannot directly test this assumption, I can test whether the treatment and comparison groups are comparable in observable characteristics. If they have different characteristics before the policy, the differences between outcomes can be attributed to two factors: pre-existing differences (selection bias) and the impact of the policy. Since treatment and comparison groups are not selected randomly, we need a comparison group with similar characteristic to the treatment group, where child labor would not have had differential trends in coca-growing states had the policy not taken place. To formally test that the pre-policy time trends for the comparison and treatment group are not different, I estimate equation (1) only for observations in the pre-policy period. Table 2 (column 1) presents estimates of equation (1) including state fixed effects. 16 The estimates suggest that children living in coca-growing states had a higher probability of engaging in market work compared with children living in non-growing states. For instance, the One potential concern is whether differences in child labor are driven by factors that are independent of changes in coca production. The identification assumption implies that the inclusion of covariates, controlling for demographic and household characteristics, should not alter estimates substantially. To address this, Columns 2 through 4 control for other covariates
IV. COCA PRODUCTION, CHILD LABOR, AND SCHOOLING
15 Table A .2 shows that coca-growing states are more rural than the rest of Peru. The coca-growing population is 47 percent rural, in comparison to 35 percent rural in the rest of the country. Non-growing states have similar primary and secondary school enrollment. In 1993, rural areas comprise 58 percent of total schools in Peru where the majority of schools are financed by the central government with a higher share in primary school (98 percent are public schools). Using School Census data for 1998 the results show that rural public schools have similar water and electricity infrastructure. Schools in non-growing states, however, are slightly better off. 16 I also estimate equation (1) for a sample excluding rural Lima (capital) and results are very similar to the reported with the entire sample.
12 that could explain the variation in child labor. Column 2 includes child characteristics to control for age-gender differences. It also includes harvesting time with an indicator that is one if the interview took place during the harvest. Coca crops can be harvested 3 to 5 times a year, which are closely related to climatic conditions. The first harvest is carried out between February and March (the period of highest rainfall), the second between May and June, and the third between August and September. In November and December, the harvest is less productive since it coincides with the dry season (UNODC 2002). Including these covariates, the estimates are within a 95 percent confident interval of the estimates in Column 1 and the significance level does not change.
I also take into account differences across regions, for instance, rural regions located on the coast may produce export goods such as cotton and sugar, while rural areas in the highlands produce food goods oriented to self-consumption that are less profitable. Moreover, changes in the returns to schooling may vary across regions. These unobserved, region-specific characteristics might bias the effects on child labor. For that reason, Column 3 includes dummy variables indicating region (coast, highlands, and jungle) interacted with time to allow for differential effects across years. The estimates show an insignificant change for 1997 and no change for the interaction of coca-growing state and year 2000.
Column 4 controls for head of household characteristics and land ownership. Parental education is a well-known determinant of child labor: parents that are more educated value education more highly than parents with no schooling do, so children in educated households will not work or work for fewer hours. Likewise, older parents will value more child labor than younger parents who can work more hours or in multiple jobs. In addition, a family with land holdings has incentives to use children's work in the family farm or enterprise. They are also 13 more likely to be affected if farming is the main income source for the household (Bhalotra 2000) . Including these covariates, the estimates show no significant changes in the interaction coefficient of coca-growing state and year.
Previous work on Peru has showed that teenage girls spend significant time taking care of younger siblings in the household and less time in school (Levison and Moe 1998) . If the child starts extensive household responsibilities, she would appear as not working and could distort the results (Edmonds and Pavnick 2005a) . The survey allows us to broaden the definition of work to include domestic work. Domestic work is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the child is engaged in more than 7 hours of domestic work a week. Table 3 shows that the probability of Table 3 shows that the coefficient on the interaction term is positive in the case of agriculture work and positive (albeit insignificant) for wage work. That is, all else being equal, the decrease in coca production are associated with higher probability of working in agricultural occupations and engaging in domestic work. In addition, I include domestic work in the definition of child labor (column 10 -12), as before the coefficient on the interaction between coca-growing state and time is positive and statistically significant for 2000. The patterns in the data are consistent with gender differences in the allocation of time found in previous studies of Peru (Ersado 2005 , Ilahi 2001 , Levison and Moe 1998 , Ray 2000 . Boys generally are more active in market work while girls are more active in domestic work. Table 4 shows the estimates using total weekly hours worked in market work and Since most children are enrolled in school, an increase in hours worked corresponds to a decrease in time spent studying, playing, or sleeping, which might undermine the effectiveness of child attendance for children that work and attend school.
Hours Worked
Schooling Outcomes
Most studies of the link between child labor and schooling find a negative correlation between the two, but they point out that some types of work are compatible with schooling.
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Therefore, the observation that a decline in coca production is associated with higher child labor does not necessarily imply a decrease in attendance rates. Schooling results are in Table 5 . In column (1) through column (3), the dependent variable is an indicator for whether a child is currently attending school. Attendance decreased by 3 percentage points in 1997 in cocagrowing states, with higher effects for boys than for girls. As pointed out before, Peru has high school enrollment rates; for that reason, it is not surprising that attendance rates did not change much in coca-growing states after the introduction of anti-coca policies.
It is well documented, however, that even though school enrollment rates are high in Peru, rural children have higher repetition rates and lower retention and student achievement than urban children do, but there is not much variation within rural areas (World Bank, 2001 ).
Attendance rates, however, does not capture time spent in school or time spent learning. For that reason, Table 5 includes other variables to analyze possible effects on school attainment. In column (4) through column (6), the dependent variable is the highest level attained by the child.
The result shows a positive effect in 1997 and negative for 2000, albeit in both cases it is not statistically significant. Other variable used in the literature to capture late entry and high failure rates is an aggregate index of age-grade distortion or over-age indicator. 18 This indicator measures if the child under consideration had a normal progress (in terms of schooling years) relative to his current age (Patrinos and Psacharopoulos 1997) . Column (7) through column (9) shows no statistical effect on over-age for children in coca-growing states. Unfortunately, in this paper it is not possible to identify additional school outcomes since information about repetition is only available in the 1994 PLSMS and there is no additional information about school performance. The Peruvian Ministry of Education has test scores only for a selected sample in urban schools for 1996 and 1998. In 2001, the sample of schools increased to incorporate rural areas.
V. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
Panel A of Table 6 divides children in coca-growing states by whether they are living in urban or rural areas. The definition of employment is the same as before (market work), but it does not consider children working in agricultural occupations in urban areas. The idea here is to check whether the interaction of the growing states*post-year is larger in rural than urban areas of coca-growing states, since it is expected that shocks generated by the coca policy are larger in the rural area. For that reason, I pooled the urban and rural sample and estimate equation (1) allowing for main effects and interactions with both coca-growing state and year dummies. The regression includes state fixed effects and controls for age, gender, harvest time, region*year of the survey, and characteristics of the household head (age and education). The coefficient of interest, the interaction of the coca-growing state*year, is allowed to differ by urban-rural status.
The estimates show that the interactions coca-growing state*year*rural are similar to those generated using only rural data: the probability of enter into market employment is higher in 2000 but the intensity of work, both in market and domestic work, is higher in 1997. For urban areas, the estimated effect for labor outcomes is small suggesting that the policy had little impact on urban children working in non-agricultural occupations in coca-growing states.
Panel B of Table 6 divides rural children in the coca-growing states by whether they reside in agricultural households. 19 All children in non-growing states are again the comparison group. The idea here is to check whether the interaction of the growing states*post-year is larger for children living in agricultural households than non-agricultural households of coca-growing states. Since the policy affects directly households that grow coca leaves, it is expected that shocks generated by the coca policy are larger for them. It is important to consider, however, that other households involved in the coca economy also are affected, for example producers of coca paste and suppliers of intermediate inputs.
Estimates show that the anti-coca policy affected similarly labor outcomes of children living in agricultural households and non-agricultural households in 1997. On the contrary, the change in the probability of entering into market work is higher for children living in agricultural households, together with higher work hours in market and domestic work in 2000. The effect on schooling is negative for all and statistically significant for children living in non-agricultural households.
Panel C of Table 6 divides rural children in the coca-growing states using categories of parental education as an indicator of permanent income to test whether poor households are more affected by anti-coca policies. 20 All children in non-growing states are again the comparison group. Low education refers to households where the highest level of education obtained by the head of household is primary (6 years of schooling) or less. Middle refers to households where the head of household obtained more than primary but less than a secondary degree (between 7
and 10 years of schooling), and High refers to households where the head of household obtained at least a secondary degree (11 years of more of schooling).
Evidence shows that poor and middle-income children are more likely to enter into market employment while those from higher-income families are not negatively affected. The decrease in coca production causes a 40 percent (0.167/0.415) and 46 percent (0.185/0.402) increase in the probability of a child entering market work for low-income and middle-income in 2000, respectively. Children with better educated parents have significantly lower probabilities of entering into the job market but there is no evidence that schooling of these children is less 20 I also used information on place of birth and educational attainment in the young adult and adult population to check for evidence of coca*time effects in older cohorts that should not be effected by anti-coca activities in the mid-1990s. Results show that there is no evidence of historical year*coca state differences in the data. Thanks to the anonymous referee for pointing this out.
affected by anti-coca policies (although these effects were not significant). In addition, there are differential effects in terms of time spend working, while the probability of market work increased for both low-income and middle-income children, poorer children work more in market activities while middle-income children work more in domestic activities. Changes in coca demand increase hours worked in market jobs (2.8 hours) for children living in cocagrowing states with low educated head of household, while children from middle educated head of household spend more hours working inside the household doing domestic chores (5.5 hours)
relative to children in non-growing states.
Further Analysis
Concerns regarding the presence of coast children, which are in many ways different from children living in the highlands and jungle, motivate the estimation of Table 7 (column 1).
Excluding from the sample rural children living on the coast, the results show a similar pattern observed for the entire sample. Columns (2) and (3) suggest that the policy affects both children living in poor and non-poor regions. Columns (4) and (5) suggest that the program had higher effects on children living in less densely populated provinces, which we expect because most coca production is illegal and produced in less densely populated areas in the highlands and jungle. In more populated areas, the effect is not statistically significant. This interpretation, however, should be taken with caution, because the estimate may pick up effects of other characteristics correlated with density (Duflo 2001 Likewise, if sending a child to work in the coca fields is seen as a practice not accepted in the community or has negative consequences such as being arrested parents may hide it. As the production of coca leaves decreased from 1995, children may have changed to other agricultural crops that are more socially acceptable, thus increasing the report but not employment. Unfortunately, it is not possible to address directly the concern that households would underreport child labor in coca cultivation. It is important, however, to note that coca production is not new or rare and it is common for mostly rural and indigenous people. Moreover, anecdotal evidence shows that it was socially acceptable to work in coca fields.
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Overall, the evidence in this section suggests that the estimates are not driven by inappropriate identification assumptions. The net effect of the decrease in coca shows that, all else being equal, a decrease in coca production is associated with more children engaging in market and domestic work with no effects on schooling outcomes. Next section examines what mechanisms could give rise to the increase in child labor.
VI. DISCUSSION
The main findings show that more children are working in market and domestic work, with no effect on schooling. Although these are reduced form results, they established that rural households respond to changes in coca production. Why do states that experience a large decline in coca demand observe a large increase in child labor and small increase in school attendance relative to non-growing states? This section examines alternative mechanisms through which the decrease in coca production might affect child labor. The conceptual framework suggests that declines in returns to education, increases in the demand for child labor, or increases in poverty may be responsible.
If returns of schooling decrease in states that were more exposed to anti-coca policies, schooling will decline and child labor will increase relative to non-growing states. The major challenge in estimating returns of schooling is that many households are engaged in selfemployment and farming where wage rates are not directly observed. Therefore, one approach is to observe behaviors that depend on the return to education rather than directly measuring the return (Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova 2007) . In this context, table 8 shows the effects of the policies on participation in wage work and weekly hours in wage work of adult males (ages 21 to 59) divided by groups of completed years of education. The idea is to check whether the interaction of the growing states*post-year is larger for adult males with low education relative to higher-educated adult males. If anti-coca policies affect returns to education negatively, it is expected to observe increases in low-skill employment relative to high-skill employment. Results suggest that adult employment changes are consistent with increasing returns to education, rather than decreasing. Table 8 shows that anti-coca policies are associated with increases in participation (column 1) and hours worked (column 2) in wage work for men with more than primary education (more than 7 years of schooling) with small effects on participation and hours in wage work for men with primary or less.
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Other possible mechanism is related to changes in labor demand. Wages and employment could decrease in states that are more exposed to coca production. Alternatively, farmers might shift toward less skill-intensive crops where the demand for child labor increases. Even if children are not directly involved in the coca economy, a reduction in coca production might affect other low-skill types of jobs. Several pieces of evidence suggest that children are not working as substitutes for unskilled labor. As table 9 shows, adult males are more likely to work in wage work, less likely in agriculture and self-employment. The increase in adult wage work is explained by increases in employment of male adults with more than primary school with small effect on participation for men with less than primary school (table 8) .
The increase in market and domestic work appears as children filling in for working parents in the family enterprise and household. The data shows that the increase in market work for children is not caused by increased in wage work, but it is operating through increases in agricultural work where 96 percent of children are non-remunerated workers in the family farm (table 3 ). The data also shows increases in domestic work (both participation and hours), especially for girls (table 3) . Unreported regression shows declines associated with changes in coca production in domestic work among adults. 22 An alternative approach to studying the link between returns no schooling and child labor is to look at improvements in school quality. While it is not possible to test directly changes in the number of primary schools and pupil/teacher ratio, evidence suggest that quality didn't decrease over time. Over the 1990s substantial policy attention has been oriented toward increasing public expenditures on education infrastructure targeted at poor districts with positive effects on school attendance (Paxson and Schady 2002 enterprise. The data shows that the decline in coca production leads to an increase in the probability of engaging in market work and hours worked among poorer and middle-income children, with negative effects on schooling, while richer children were not affected (Table 6 ).
In addition, the fact that negative schooling results are in non-agricultural households with no increases in market work ( Table 6 ) might reflect that children living in non-agricultural households can not work in the family enterprise or farm to buffer the negative shock in adult labor demand, so the household takes a larger hit to its consumption. 24 Table 10 shows falls in consumption in non-agricultural and agricultural households in both years. The effect is higher and significant in non-agricultural households where per capita expenditures decreased by 16 and 18 percent in 1997 and 2000, respectively. The results also show that there is a rising in idleness (children reporting neither working nor attending school) and reduction in school expenditures in non-farm households located in coca-growing states (albeit insignificant). 25 The decline in schooling in non-farm households might suggest that households may pull children out of school 23 There are no significant changes in other correlates of poverty as well (fertility, idleness of children, housing stock attributes -water, sewage, and electricity-, and durable goods ownership -ratio, TV, and refrigerator). Results are available upon request. 24 One concern might be that the estimate could capture the fact that non-agricultural households are wealthier; however, there is no strong correlation between household expenditure in 1994 and non-agricultural households (the coefficient of correlation is 0.14). 25 The 1997 and 2000 questionnaires are more detailed than the 1994 questionnaire in its inquiries about amount spend in education. The 1994 ask how much the household spend last enrollment, while the 1997 and 2000 ask how much the household spend last time, in which month, and how many times in the last 12 months. As a result, these findings will be interpreted with caution.
to save on schooling costs. Saavedra and Suarez (2002) show that even though public education is free most households finance an important part of the direct cost (books, uniforms, transportation cost, food, and monetary transfers) as a result of low public spending in basic education in the country. They estimate that households support about 33 percent of the total expenditure in primary and secondary education. Similarly, a report about children living in two coca-growing valleys in Peru found that 34 percent of dropout children do not attend school due to monetary constraints (UNICEF 2006).
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper exploits an exogenous shift in coca production from Peru to Colombia in the mid-1990s to provide empirical evidence on the indirect effects of changes coca production on results are robust to the inclusion of household characteristics and state fixed effects, ii) differences in effects by urban/rural status are also consistent with the notion that anti-coca policies affect rural households, iii) there are differential effects by whether the child resides in agricultural or non-agricultural households, and by education of the head of household. Given high school enrollment rates in rural Peru, these results indicate that children are not withdrawn from school completely but rather working part time.
In addition, adults have less employment probability and work less hours in agricultural activities. Patterns observed here suggest that children are not working in the formal market as substitutes for unskilled labor; rather the increase in market and domestic work appears as children filling in for working parents. In addition, schooling cost appears to play a role in households where children cannot work in the family enterprise or farm to buffer the negative shock in adult labor demand.
Overall, these results provide evidence of an undocumented negative effect of anti-coca policies on household behavior. This complements evidence from other countries, Angrist and Kugler (2005) in their study on Colombia found that an increased in coca production increased hours worked by teenage boys but had no effect on employment participation. It is important to 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Note: Child labor refers to children engaged in market work (includes wage employment, self-employment, agriculture, unpaid work in a family business, helping in the family farm, among others). Harvest effect is a dummy representing in the month of the survey was during harvest or not. Region represents three dummies for each region (coast, highland, and jungle) interacted with each year. Head of household characteristics are age and education. Population weights used to reflect sample design. Note: Child labor refers to children engaged in market work (it includes wage employment, self-employment, agriculture, unpaid work in a family business, helping in the family farm, among others). Harvest effect is a dummy representing in the month of the survey was during harvest or not. Region represents three dummies for each region (coast, highland, and jungle) interacted with each year. Head of household characteristics are age and education. Population density and percentage of poor people refers to the district of residency, this data comes from the 1993 Peruvian Census. 
